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DIA CONTRIBUTION

TO

USIB MEMORANDUM ON CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKING INDIA THROUGH BURMESE TERRITORY

17 MAY 1963

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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25X1C

CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKING INDIA THROUGH BURMESE TERRITORY

I. REFERENCES

A. USIB Memorandum of 17 April 1963, "Chinese Communist Ground Threat Against India from Tibet and Sinkiang".

DIA 25X6 [redacted]

II. ASSUMPTIONS

A. This estimate is predicated upon the following assumptions:

1. That the Government of Burma would offer no resistance to the deployment of Chinese troops across Burmese territory and would acquiesce to Chinese utilization of Burmese transportation facilities and airfields.

2. That the Burmese population, economy and military forces would not actively support the Chinese effort.

3. That in the conduct of the offensive through Burma the Chinese would not be required to deploy security troops on airfields and along logistic routes within Burma, screen or protect their southern (left) flank, or effect ground and air augmentations along China's Southeast Asia border.

III. GROUND OPERATIONS

A. Logistics

1. The theater of operations for a Chinese Communist offensive against India through Burma encompasses Yunnan Province in Communist China's Kunming Military Region, upper Burma north of Mandalay, and the states of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur in northeast India. Theater depots located at Kunming are served by road from the inland railhead at Anshun, and by rail via Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam.

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2. Supplies scheduled for Chinese ground forces engaged in military operations in India would have to be moved over lines of communications extending some 1100 miles beyond Kunming to the Brahmaputra River. The initial transportation leg would cover the route between Kunming, Ipinglang, and Hsinchieh, near the Sino-Burmese border and some 330 miles west of Kunming. From Hsinchieh the Chinese could move supplies across Burma to the Indo-Burmese border via the following main supply routes:

(a) Over the Ledo Road via Myitkyina, and

(b) Over the Burma Road to Mandalay and thence by way of the Mandalay-Imphal highway.

3. It is estimated that a maximum daily resupply tonnage of 985 tons for ground operations would be required at Ipinglang; at Kunming air operations would require not more than 400 tons. Although the daily resupply requirements of some 1400 tons would tax the rail line into Kunming, it is estimated that rail facilities between Hanoi and Kunming would be adequate for delivery of this tonnage. If necessary, the Chinese could move several hundred tons per day by truck to Kunming from the Anshun railhead.

4. Of the 985 tons delivered by rail to Ipinglang, a total of 640 tons per day could be transported during the dry season to Gauhati and Dibrugarh. The remaining 345 tons would consist of gasoline consumed by the motor transport. The maximum of approximately 10,000 trucks, required in these resupply operations, would constitute about 10% of the Chinese military truck park and about 5% of the national inventory. In addition to the available military motor transport, there are about 6,000 civilian trucks in Yunnan Province.* On an annual basis,

* Although it is assumed that the Chinese would not be afforded the benefits of the Burmese economy, it is of interest to note that there are as many as 13,000 trucks in Burma.

[redacted] 25X1C

nearly 150,000 tons of motor gasoline (10% of China's 1962 inventory) would be required for tactical and resupply operations.

5. If the Chinese were to launch attacks into India from Tibet-Sinkiang and Burma, a total of about 50,000 trucks would be required for supply movements (see reference A). This would amount to approximately 50% of the available Chinese military truck park or about 25% of the nation's serviceable military-civilian inventory. Tactical and logistic support operations during both offensives would require, on an annual basis, about 750,000 tons of motor gasoline, or more than 50% of the motor gasoline available in all of China in 1962.

6. Although China could make available the motor transport and gasoline required to logistically support the offensives against India across the Himalayan frontier and through Burma, to do so would necessitate a substantial reallocation of the nation's transportation and POL resources. Trucks would have to be re-distributed from other military regions and many rural sections of the country would be required to rely on a minimal availability of motor transportation. Many organizational and managerial problems would arise, and it is questionable whether the military or governmental transportation agencies could cope with the these problems.

7. Daily resupply requirements for the army headquarters and its combat support elements, the standard and light infantry divisions, and the artillery regiment (army) are shown in Annex A.

B. Composition of the Attack Force

1. It is estimated that the composition of the Chinese Communist force could include (a) an army headquarters

25X1C

to provide operational control along the axes of advance, (b) lightly-equipped infantry divisions for the assault phase across the mountainous jungle terrain along the Indo-Burmese border, and (c) an operational reserve consisting of standard infantry divisions with their organic medium artillery and tanks, to be employed on the Assam plain in the combat-in-depth phase.

2. These ground units could be provided by the two armies currently accepted in order of battle as located in the Kunming Military Region or deployed from China's strategic ground reserve. In any case, sufficient numbers of trained and equipped infantry divisions are readily available from China's standing army.

3. Tables of personnel and equipment for the army headquarters (command group and staff, artillery regiment, and combat support elements), and the infantry division (standard) are shown in Annexes B and C respectively.

C. Operational Considerations

1. Staging of these troops probably would be accomplished within Chinese territory. In order to insure maximum tactical surprise the Chinese probably would transport the force rapidly across Burma, and after the shortest possible delay in attack positions located on the Burma side of the frontier, launch their division-size attacks into northeast India. Since it is assumed that the Chinese would not have had the opportunity to pre-position military stores within Burma, resupply operations would necessarily be programmed to follow immediately behind the troop convoys.

D. Climate

1. An offensive during the southwest monsoon (May-September) would be extremely difficult, but not impossible,

25X1C

to support logistically. The most favorable period for military operations in the area occurs at the beginning of the dry season in November. Refer to Annex D for a detailed discussion of the climatic effects on ground and air operations.

E. Avenues of Attack

1. It is estimated that the Chinese would utilize two major avenues of advance into northeast India; both are extensions of the trans-Burma supply routes and lead from the Indo-Burmese border northward through Ledo and across the Digboi oil fields to Dibrugarh, and westward to Gauhati via Imphal and Kohima.

F. Offensive Capabilities and Objectives

1. In simultaneous advances over the two selected avenues of attack into India, the Chinese could employ and logistically support a force estimated at 85,000 troops, organized into approximately six infantry divisions and one artillery regiment (army), under the command of an army headquarters.

2. Along the northern axis leading to Dibrugarh the Chinese force could consist of major elements of two infantry divisions (light), one infantry division (standard), and an artillery regiment (army). It is believed that Chinese objectives in this attack would be the destruction of Indian Army forces, the seizure of the Digboi oil fields, and the eventual link-up with Chinese operations from Tibet into the eastern part of the Northeast Frontier Agency (see reference A).

3. In the advance towards Gauhati the Chinese could employ two infantry divisions (light) and one infantry division (standard). In this attack Chinese objectives would be the destruction of Indian forces and, in conjunction with the Chinese attack from Tibet across Bhutan into the Gauhati area north of the Brahmaputra River, the establishment of a blocking position

south of the river (see reference A). This maneuver would effectively deny the Indians access to all of Assam east of Gauhati and, at the same time, facilitate the effective occupation of the Northeast Frontier Agency and the critical areas of northeast India.

IV. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Tactical

1. There are 19 airfields within China and 12 within northern Burma which could be used for the employment of Chinese Communist Air Forces (see Annexes E and F). Because of location and logistical restrictions, however, only six of the former and two of the latter have been considered for utilization. Of the six Chinese fields, four were previously referred to in [redacted] DIA 25X6 DIA 25X6 [redacted] (see Reference B). These are Lhasa, Nagchhu Dzong, Yushu and Kunming. Two have been added for purposes of this study--Mengtzu West and Chengtu/Wenchiang. The Burmese airfields to be utilized are Myitkyina and Namponmao. A program of improving existing forward airfields in Burma and the use of airfields that may be captured in India have been considered and could result in continuing forward deployment of fighter/ground attack aircraft to the immediate vicinity of the active battle area.

2. In a Chinese ground attack against northeast India involving operations from Tibet as well as from Yunnan Province through Burma, a total of 395 tactical aircraft could be employed. Of this figure, 190 have been referred to previously in the aforementioned 17 January 1963 study divided as follows: 120 Mig 15/17s (FAGOT/FRESCOs), 50 Il-28s (BEAGLES), and 20 Tu-2s (BATS).* For operations across Burma, an additional 205 aircraft

* It will be recalled that the 17 January 1963 study was concerned with a Chinese attack from Sinkiang province and Tibet and 290 aircraft represented the air threat. These 290 aircraft were apportioned 100 to Sinkiang airbases for operations against the Ladakh-Jammu-Kashmir area and 190 for operations against the Northeast Frontier Agency and upper Brahmaputra River valley areas of northeastern India. Because operations across Burma would also be directed against northeastern India, these 190 aircraft have been included in this problem as well.

have been deployed including 180 Mig 15/17s and 25 Il-28s. Included within the jet fighter total are 30 Mig-17D limited all-weather aircraft. These will assist in the air defense of the important military and industrial complexes of Chengtu and Kunming. Locations of all aircraft are identified in Annexes E and F, and logistics requirements for this force are noted in Annex G.

3. Because of range limitations, Myitkyina and Namponmao Burma-based jets would be the only fighter aircraft that could be employed in a ground attack role. From these two Burmese bases, the fighters could provide close support to ground forces generally within an area embracing Imphal, Dibrugarh and Sadiya in India (see Map, Annex). Tu-2 aircraft, in attacks from Nagchhu Dzong airfield in Tibet, could also provide support to ground forces as far south as Imphal. Il-28s would have the range to conduct bombing attacks and reconnaissance over northeast India and jet fighters on combat air patrol could cover all of India east of East Pakistan and Nepal.

4. It is estimated that the CCAF can maintain an aircraft in-commission rate of approximately 60% with daily sorties numbering 360. This would equate to 75 ground support and 215 air defense/CAP sorties by jet fighters. The jet light bombers can conduct 55 sorties per day and the piston light bombers 15 sorties per day. The total daily tonnage of ordnance on target is estimated as follows:

Il-28s	120
Tu-2s	20
Mig 15/17s	57*
	197

B. Support

1. It is believed that approximately 120 light and small transport aircraft could be utilized in supporting operations through Burma. The 30 Il-12s, 16 Il-14s, and 28 C-46s

* 21 tons represents bombs. 36 tons represents gun ammunition for all jet fighter missions--ground support or air defense/CAP.

of the Thirteenth Air Division could support the airfields at Myitkyina and Namponmao from the Chengtu area as long as airborne operations were not contemplated elsewhere. In addition, 7 Li-2s and 3 C-47s of the Thirteenth Air Division could operate from Mandalay and 35 An-2s could be located in Burma as follows: 10 at Singkaling Hkami South, 10 at Kolemya and 15 at Katha.

2. The aircraft based in the Chengtu area would be capable of delivering about 132 tons of material daily to the two Burmese airfields. They probably would be used to develop and maintain initial stocks of POL and ammunition. The aircraft probably could operate on about 25% more flying days than could the fighter aircraft they were supporting. This assistance would be continued until about one week prior to any planned airborne assault at which time the division would undergo a major stand down to ready aircraft for assault operations.

3. The ten aircraft based at Mandalay would provide support for the An-2 bases or additional assistance to Myitkyina and Namponmao by moving forward the 50 tons of material allocated to the air forces at this point. In addition, they could maintain liaison and lift supplies from Kunming airfield if needed.

4. The An-2s would be committed exclusively to supporting the ground forces. It is believed that these aircraft would be able to maintain an availability rate of about 65 to 70 percent and a sortie rate of two per day. Each aircraft could carry about one ton of cargo for air dropping or 10 paratroops.

5. In view of the fact that concurrent military operations from Tibet and Yunnan Province through Burma would tend to over-commit the limited air transport force, replacement aircraft would not be available for any transports lost through combat attrition.

Annex A

25X1C

DAILY RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR SELECTED CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY UNITS

Unit	CLASS I (Rations)	CLASS II & IV (General Supplies)	CLASS III (POL)	CLASS V (Ammunition)	TOTAL* (All Classes)
Army Hq (including Command & Staff and Combat Support elements)	5.2	4.7	9.9	0.6	20.4
Arty Regt (Army)	2.1	1.9	7.3	18.7	30.0
Inf Div (Standard)	24.6	22.3	34.9	45.9	127.7
Inf Div (Light)	23.6	21.5	4.8	38.2	88.1

* Short tons based on "average combat rates" at 85% TOE.

25X1C

Annex B

25X1C

TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT, ARMY HEADQUARTERS AND COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS (AT 100% TOE)

	Total	Cmd Grp & Staff	Arty Regt	Sig Bn	Gd Bn	Rcn Bn	Eng Bn
Personnel:							
Officers	783	403	207	38	54	42	39
Enlisted	4355	1581	1290	257	356	428	443
Total	5138	1984	1497	295	410	470	482
Equipment:							
Gun How, 152 mm	12		12				
Gun, 130/122 mm	12		12				
Mortar, 160 mm	12		12				
LMG, 7.62 mm	72				27	27	18
SMG, 7.62 mm	785	71	203	64	66	339	42
Carbine, 7.62 mm	2144	298	1075	158	212	37	364
Pistol, 7.62 mm	562	257	146	33	64	31	31
Truck, Cargo, 6x6	105		90				15
Truck, Cargo, 4x2	173	157	15	1			
Truck, 1/4T, 6x4	12	7	5				
Truck, Ambulance							
Truck, Radio Van	1			1			
Motorcycle	30			24	2	2	2
Bicycle	24			24			
Cart							
Horse	96			24	12	12	48

25X1C

25X1C

TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT, INFANTRY DIVISION (STANDARD) (AT 100% TOE)

	Total	Cmd Grp & Staff	Chem Co	Sig Bn	Recn Co	Engr Bn	AT Bn	AA AW Bn	B A N D	Ord Plat	Arty Regt	Tk-A/G Regt	Inf Regts (each)
Personnel:													
Officers	1819	210	9	41	10	39	54	57	1	1	207	134	352
Enlisted	15,766	710	134	283	129	443	364	376	37	37	1290	590	3791
Total	17,585	920	143	324	139	482	418	433	38	38	1497	724	4143
Equipment:													
How, 122-mm	12										12		
Gun, 76-mm	12										12		
Gun,AT,57/76-mm	39						12						9
Gun,AAAW,37/57-mm	12							12					
Mort,120-mm	39										12		9
Mort,82-mm	81												27
Rcl Rfl,57-mm	27												9
Rcl Rfl,75-mm	27												9
AA,90-mm	54												18
AAMG, 12.7-mm	39									12			9
HMG, 7.62-mm	135												45
LMG, 7.62-mm	378				9	18							117
SMG, 7.62-mm	3499	112	18	18	112	42		77		4	203	156	919
Cbn, 7.62-mm	8717	225	116	213		364		297		33	1075	280	2038
Pistol, 7.62-mm	1867	169	7	36	7	31		45	2	1	146	181	414
Flamethrower	Unk		Unk										
Tank, med	32											32	
Armd Recon Veh	3											3	
Aslt Gun,SU 76/100	12											12	
Trk, Cargo,6x6	382+	6	Unk			15		25			90	12	78
Trk, Cargo,4x2	107	70						10			15	12	

25X1C

25X1C

	Total	Cmd Grp & Staff	Chem Co	Sig Bn	Rcn Co	Engr Bn	AT Bn	AA AW Bn	B A N D	Ord Plat	Arty Regt	Tk-A/G Regt	Inf Regts (each)
Equipment Cont'd:													
Trk, 1/4T	36	8						1			5	4	6
Trk, Ambulance	4	4											
Motorcycle	25		5	6			2					12	
Bicycle	15			15									
Cart	396+	45											117+
Horse	780+	135		33		45+							189+

25X1C

ANNEX D

THE EFFECT OF CLIMATE ON GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS IN THE INDIA-BURMA AREA

1. Ground Operations

a. Southwest monsoon. Mid-May through September, is quite warm and humid. Day temperatures are in the 80's (°F.) and 90's, lowering to the 60's and 70's at night, except cooler temperatures are common at higher elevations. Relative humidity averages 80% or more much of the time. Cloudiness ranges 8/10 or more during the morning at most places, with convective clouds in the afternoon and evening covering 7/10 or more of the sky. Precipitation generally averages from 10 to 20 inches per month, with some exposed slopes receiving more than 25 inches. Thunderstorms are common in the spring and the southwest monsoon seasons. Their frequency is determined by local conditions; at some locations thunderstorms occur on 50% of the days in some months. This season would clearly be the most unfavorable one for most military operations.

b. Autumn. Mostly during the month of October, is the transition season from the wet southwest monsoon to the dry northeast monsoon.

c. The northeast monsoon. November to about mid-March, is the dry winter season. Precipitation is at a minimum, averaging less than 2 inches per month at most places. Cloudiness is usually scattered to broken with little diurnal variation. Temperatures are mostly in the 60's and 70's during the day, dropping to 40's and 50's at night; freezing temperatures may occur at higher elevations. Relative humidities are generally high in the morning, averaging 70% or more at most locations and lowering to a minimum during the afternoon and evening. This would be the most favorable season for most military operations.

d. Spring. Generally from mid-March through mid-May, is the transition from the dry winter to the wet summer. Over much of this sector, temperatures reach a maximum just before the onset of the southwest monsoon, averaging a few degrees warmer than in the summer. Thunderstorms are common with the advance of the southwest monsoon.

2. Air Operations

a. Weather conditions are least favorable for air operations during the southwest monsoon season, when cloudiness and precipitation are at a maximum. Convective-type clouds are predominant with frequent layers of middle and high clouds. Cloudiness is generally most predominant over the southwest slopes and peaks of the mountains. Thunderstorms and showers are frequent in this season. Aircraft icing is most hazardous near 15,000 to 18,000 feet. Flying conditions are generally worse during the 1 or 2 expected tropical storms per season in this region. Winds aloft are mostly southerly, shifting to southeasterly at about 10,000 feet.

b. Weather conditions are generally favorable for air operations during the northeast monsoon season. However, strong westerly winds above 20,000 feet are sometimes present. Aircraft icing may occur at times above 10,000 to 13,000 feet, but is usually not a major problem since cloudiness is at a minimum.

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AIRFIELDS AND AIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE IN TIBET AND SOUTHWEST CHINA

Airfield Name	Distance to Border (NM)	Coords	Elevation ft.	Length ft.	Surface	Estimate of Participating Aircraft Tactical Ftrs	Bombers	Trspts
1. Lhasa	180	30°30'N 91°05'E	14,000 (AMSL)	13,000	Asphalt	60 Mig 15/17s[a]		
2. Nagchhu Dzong	220	31°33'N 91°43'E	15,000 (AMSL)	12,000	Crushed Rock		(20 Tu-2s [a] (25 Il-28s [a]	
3. Yushu	220	32°53'N 96°47'E	12,500 (AMSL)	8,000	Crushed Rock	30 Mig 15/17s[a]		
4. Kantzu	270	31°37'N 100°12'E	11,500 (AMSL)	14,000	Crushed Rock			
5. Chengtu/ Feng-Huang-Shan	360	30°44'N 104°00'E	1,640 (AMSL)	4,600	Macadam			
6. Kuanghan	370	30°57'N 104°20'E	1,640 (AMSL)	8,300	Macadam			
7. Chengtu/Wenchiang	315	30°43'N 103°57'E	1,700 (AMSL)	7,500	Concrete	30 Mig 15/17s[b]	25 Il-28s	(30 Il-12s (28 C-46s (16 Il-14s
8. Chengtu/ Shuangliu	310	30°35'N 103°57'E	1,640 (AMSL)	7,200	Concrete			
9. Chengtu/ Taiping SSU	350	30°16'N 104°01'E	1,640 (AMSL)	5,000	Macadam			
10. Hsinching	340	30°25'N 103°51'E	1,500 (AMSL)	7,000	Macadam			

Airfield Name	Distance to Border (NM)	Coords	Elevation ft.	Length ft.	Surface	Estimate of Participating Aircraft Tactical Ftrs	Bombers	Trspts
11. Hsichang	195	27°55'N 102°13'E	5,000 (AMSL)	4,900	Macadam			
12. Peitun	130	25°27'N 100°44'E	6,420 (AMSL)	6,600	Macadam			
13. Paoshan	65	25°04'N 99°09'E	5,490 (AMSL)	4,900	Macadam			
14. Mangshih	25	24°24'N 98°31'E	3,020 (AMSL)	5,600	Sod			
15. Kunming	230	25°00'N 102°45'E	6,240 (AMSL)	9,500	Concrete	60 Mig 15/17s[a/b/]	25 Il-28s[a/]	
16. Mengsa	40	23°43'N 99°37'E	4,500 (AMSL)	8,000	Sod			
17. Ssumao North	85	22°47'N 100°57'E	4,120 (AMSL)	6,800	Macadam			
18. Menghsi	10	22°00'N 100°16'E	4,800 (AMSL)	4,300	Sod			
19. Mengtzu West	215	23°24'N 103°19'E	4,720 (AMSL)	8,200	Concrete	30 Mig 15/17s[b/]		

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a/ Order of Battle previously identified in the [redacted] with the exception of Kunming fighters. In the earlier study only 30 Mig 15/17s were estimated to be operating from that location. 30 additional fighters have been added for purposes of this study.
b/ Includes 10 Mig 17D aircraft.

Annex F

25X1C

AIRFIELDS AND CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE IN NORTHERN BURMA

Airfield Name	Distance to Indian Border (NM)	Coords	Elevation ft.	Length ft.	Surface and runway condition	Estimate of Participating Aircraft		
						Tactical Ftrs	Bombers	Trspts
1. Putao	15	27°20'N 97°26'E	1,490	6,000	Clay, Fair			
2. Singkaling Hkamti South	30	25°28'N 95°41'E	600	4,200	Gravel, Good			10 AN-2s
3. Namponmao	125	25°21'N 97°17'E	470	6,600	Asphalt, Good	30 Mig 15/17s		
4. Myitkyina South	135	25°22'N 97°21'E	472	6,000	Asphalt, Good	60 Mig 15/17s		
5. Katha	100	24°09'N 96°19'E	320	5,280	Latemite, Good			15 AN-2s
6. Bhamo	140	24°16'N 97°15'E	360	6,060	Asphalt, Poor			
7. Kalemyo	40	23°11'N 94°04'E	100	4,200	Latemite, Good			10 AN-2s
8. Mongmit	150	23°06'N 96°39'E	600	5,280	Gravel, Fair			
9. Lashio	210	22°58'N 97°45'E	2,450	4,500	Bitumen, Good			
10. Gangaw	50	22°11'N 94°08'E	700	3,600	Gravel, Fair			

Airfield Name	Distance to Indian Border (NM)	Coords	Elevation ft.	Length ft.	Surface and runway condition	Estimate of Participating Aircraft Tactical Ftrs	Bombers	Trspts
11. Monywa	115	22°13'N 95°05'E	260	4,900	Gravel, Fair			
12. Mandalay	160	21°56'N 96°05'E	250	4,000	Bitumen, Fair			(7 Li-2s (3 C-47s

25X1C

25X1C

25X1C

Airfields & Aircraft	Mission	POL & LUB A/C and Rolling Stock	Ammo & Bombs	Tech Supplies	Common Use Items Includes Personnel	Total Short Tons
A. CHINESE AIRFIELDS						
1. LHASA						
60 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Air Defense/ Combat Air Patrol (CAP)	84	8	2	10	104
2. NAGCHHU DZONG						
25 Il-28s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Bomb/Rec	137	40	3	6	186
20 Tu-2s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Ground Support	18	20	2	3	43
					TOTAL	333[a/]
3. YUSHU						
30 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Air Defense/CAP	42	4	1	5	52[b/]

25X1C

Airfields & Aircraft	Mission	POL & LUB A/C and Rolling Stock	Ammo & Bombs	Tech Supplies	Common Use Items Includes Personnel	Total Short Tons
4. CHENGTU/WENCHIANG						
30 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Air Defense/ CAP	42	4	1	5	52
25 IL-28s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Bomb/Rec	137	40	3	6	186
					TOTAL	238[c/]
5. KUNMING						
60 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Air Defense/ CAP	84	8	2	10	104
25 Il-28s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Bomb/Rec	137	40	3	6	186
					TOTAL	290[d/]
6. MENGTZU WEST						
30 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Air Defense/ CAP	42	4	1	5	52[d/]

25X1C

Airfields & Aircraft	Mission	POL & LUB A/C and Rolling Stock	Ammo & Bombs	Tech Supplies	Common Use Items Includes Personnel	Total Short Tons
B. BURMESE AIRFIELDS						
1. MYITKYINA						
60 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Ground Attack, Air Defense, CAP	84	8	2	10	104
2. NAMPONMAO						
30 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Ground Attack, Air Defense, CAP	42	4	1	5	52
					TOTAL	156 e/

a/ This tonnage provided as indicated in para 25 [redacted] 25X6 DIA

b/ This tonnage provided by truck from Hsining-Lanchou railhead. It is not a restrictive factor in this problem.

c/ This tonnage is not a restrictive factor due to proximity of major railhead.

d/ At least 400 short tons per day are required and available to support air operations out of total tonnage delivered daily to Kunming by rail and roadway.

e/ All logistic support to Myitkyina and Namponmao must be air transported. Approximately 132 tons are delivered daily by 13th Air Division transports from the major railhead adjacent to the Chengtu airfield complex. In addition, 10 transports based at Mandalay are capable of delivering approximately 32 tons per day to Myitkyina and Namponmao or to AN-2s at Singkaling Hkamti South, Katha, or Kalemyo. Additional tonnage is also considered available to support fighter operations at Myitkyina and Namponmao, inasmuch as transports probably would be able to operate about 25% more flying days than would the fighter aircraft they support.

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25X1C

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